Chapter 1 – A Single Argument using Rule-based Reasoning
Learning Outcomes
- Understand that every legal analysis or argument is simply the application of a rule to facts.
- Be able to
- Explain a rule using key terms;
- Ground a rule in binding authority; and
- Apply the rule’s key terms to the facts of your case.
Citations to New York case law are in New York Law Reports Style Manual form.
Citations to federal case law are in Bluebook form.
Except for purely legal arguments, such as the meaning of a rule, every objective analysis and persuasive argument is rule-based, that is the application of a rule to facts. So, when analyzing a legal issue or making a legal argument, you must apply the rule that governs an issue to the relevant facts raised by the issue. Legal writers apply rules to facts when they write objective memos, persuasive briefs, client letters, and draft pleadings. Often novice legal writers have a hard time distinguishing legal arguments based on the application of a rule to a set of facts and those based on reasoning by analogy. The result is arguments that are incomplete and poorly organized. It is important to understand that arguments based on rule application and those based on analogy are separate and distinct, even though you may have learned about them together as components of the organizational framework you learned about in your legal writing class.
While all legal analysis and argument relies on rule-based reasoning, as explained in Chapter 2, arguments based on reasoning by analogy are usually, but not always necessary. When legal writers forget this and rely solely on analogies rather than rule application, the resulting product is an unfocused series of case illustrations, which are of little or no use.
As a 1L you learned that when analyzing or arguing a single issue, you should follow an organizational form called CRAC, CREAC, or IRAC, or something similar. Whatever acronym you learned, the structure is essentially the same. Except that IRAC teaches to begin with “issue” while CREAC and CRAC teach to begin with “conclusion.” In clinical writing, it is better to begin with your conclusion since legal readers want to know your conclusion before reading your analysis or argument. In contrast, when taking an exam, your professor may prefer you begin with “issue.”
CREAC is small-scale organization or the organization of a single issue governed by a single rule. In contrast is large-scale organization, which is the structure of a broad argument that is governed by more than one rule. In this book, I write only about small-scale or single legal arguments
To ensure we begin on the same page, here is an illustration of where within large-scale organization the single legal arguments are placed. The single arguments are:
I. THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT THE DEFENDANT DRIVER’S NEGLIGENCE BECAUSE HE BREACHED HIS DUTY OF REASONABLE CARE AND THE BREACH CAUSED THE PLAINTIFF PEDESTRIAN TO SUFFER SIGNIFICANT INJURY
A. The Defendant Driver Breached His Duty of Care when he Drove at the Unreasonable Speed of Forty-Five MPH in a Thirty MPH Zone
CREAC Here, and
B. The Defendant Driver Caused the Plaintiff to Suffer a Serious Injury Because She Sustained Multiple Herniated Disks When the Defendant Driver Struck Her with His Vehicle
CREAC Here
The foundation of legal reasoning is simply the application of a rule to facts. A rule states “if a certain condition exists, then a certain legal condition results.” Fn» Or if A, then B. In the example above, each of the two single arguments are about one element of negligence: sub-point A is about duty, and sub-point B is about injury. The rule that governs argument sub-point A is “if a plaintiff shows a defendant acted unreasonably, the plaintiff establishes the defendant breached their duty.” The rule that governs sub-point B is “if a plaintiff establishes a defendant caused the plaintiff to suffer serious injury, the plaintiff establishes the injury element of negligence.”
Keep in mind that a single legal argument is the application of a specific rule to a set of facts. Lawyers do this when they set out the law and apply them to the facts of the case. Thus, at its simplest, a single legal argument is the application of a rule to the relevant facts (a RAC). Here is a complete legal argument:
Rule – If a driver travels in excess of 30 mph on Delaware Avenue, he is in violation of. N.Y. V&T Law sec. xx.
Application – Joe was driving his car at a rate of 45 mph on Delaware Avenue when he was stopped by a police officer.
Conclusion – Thus, Joe was in violation of N.Y. V&T Law sec. xx when he drove on Delaware Avenue.
You can use this type of simple rule application when you write a brief or memo. In addition, you might use it when you write a client letter. For example, if you write to a client explaining why you will or will not pursue a claim on their behalf, you will include the rule and then apply it to the facts of your client’s case. Here is a sample client letter with a single legal argument:
Dear Joe:
I write to follow up on our July 8th meeting.
On March 11, 2022, you were issued a ticket for speeding on Delaware Avenue. More specifically, you are charged with driving at 45-mph in a 30-mph zone. You want to challenge the charge because you already have three speeding violations on your license, and your insurance company will not renew your policy should you get a fourth violation.
I strongly suggest we enter into a plea negotiation with the town prosecutor. She will probably agree to reduce the charge to a non-moving violation, since the town can keep in its coffers any money it collects from you as a result of a non-moving violation. In contrast, the state keeps money collected for a speeding conviction.
If we ask for a trial to contest the ticket, you will lose because the speed limit on Delaware Avenue is 30-mph, and police radar shows you were traveling at 45-mph. Thus, you were in violation of N.Y. V&T Law sec. xx. (Explanation)»
Please let me know how you wish to proceed before our scheduled court appearance on August 22.
Signature
Most legal issues are based on rules that, unlike N.Y. V&T Law sec. xx, include vague or ambiguous terms. When writing a brief or memo, you will usually need to expand the simple rule, application, conclusion by (1) adding an explanation of the key terms that define the rule and (2) then applying the same key terms to the facts of your case. These steps let the reader know the meaning of your rule and why the facts do or do not satisfy it.
Generally, the rule must be explained or defined through its key terms before it is applied, so RAC becomes REAC. And since legal readers want to know the conclusion to an argument at the beginning, they begin with a conclusion (C). Put it all together, and you have CREAC. This is rule-based reasoning.
Here is a chart of the organization of a single legal argument based solely on rule-based reasoning:
C – initial conclusion
R – the element/rule at issue (“if a certain condition exists, then a certain legal condition results.”) Fn»
E – rule explained through key terms
A – Apply the key phrases from the rule explanation in the same order that they appear in the rule explanation
C – final conclusion
Here is an annotated CREAC rule-based argument (key terms, which you will read about later in this chapter are highlighted for illustrative purposes only). It is an excerpt from a brief in opposition to summary judgment submitted by a prisoner plaintiff in a civil rights claim. In Chapter 2, you will find this same annotated CREAC, with reasoning by analogy (the subject of Chapter 2) added.
References to R indicate where the writer would cite to a page in the record to support a factual statement.
The evidence before this Court raises genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendant guard knew that the plaintiff prisoner was at a substantial risk of serious harm. (Explanation)»
Prison officials meet the knowledge prong of a deliberate indifference claim when they are subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to prisoners (Explanation)» Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, at 837. Although an official “must be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference,” a claimant can demonstrate that an official had knowledge if a risk is obvious. Id., at 837, 844. An obvious risk can be shown by evidence that prison assaults were “longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials” because these circumstances suggest an official must have known. Id., at 842-43. (Explanation)»
Whether a prison official is subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm “is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence.” Id., at 842. Advance notice is not necessary to establish knowledge if a prisoner falls into a victim prone category. Id., at 843; Corbett v. Kelly, No. 97-CV-0682 E, 2000 WL 1335749, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2000). Thus, a prison official may be put on notice that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm if there is a similar history of violence at the prison. (Explanation)» One circumstance that can give rise to knowledge of an obvious risk is if there are classes of victim-prone prisoners whom officials know are more susceptible to attack. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843.
Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to Fox raises the inference that Rath knew that Fox was at a substantial risk of serious harm for two reasons. One, Rath knew that as a convicted sex offender Fox was victim prone. After all, Rath admitted he knew that the DOJ found sex offenders at the Holding Center were targeted, and he knew that Fox was a convicted sex offender. (R.30).
Two, Rath knew about Ball’s well-documented history of violent behavior towards sex offenders and Rath knew Ball was a security risk ordered to stay away from other prisoners. Ball had a well-documented history of violent offenses on his intake sheet, including an assault on a convicted sex offender at the Holding Center. (R.29). Because Ball had assaulted another prisoner earlier in the same day he assaulted Fox, he was classified as a security risk and ordered not to comingle with other prisoners (R.53, 55). Rath heard Ball threaten that prisoner hours before he assaulted Fox. And Rath admitted he had read both Ball’s Intake Sheet and the order that classified Ball as a security risk. (R.29, 53, 56). (Explanation)» Ball calling Fox a “pervert” as he beat him to death all serve as a factual basis from which a jury could rationally infer that Rath was on notice that Fox faced a substantial risk of harm. (Explanation)»
These facts would allow a jury to draw the reasonable inference that Rath knew Fox was at risk of harm. Thus, there are questions of fact about whether Rath knew Fox was at risk of harm. (Explanation)»
Exercise 1-1
Question 1: What’s wrong with the rule in this argument?
Conclusion – Joe exclaimed that “the light was red” immediately after the motor vehicle accident. His statement should be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Rule – A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused, is an excited utterance, which is not excluded as hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 803(2)
Application – Joe’s statement that “the light was red” is an excited utterance.
Conclusion – Therefore, Joe’s statement is an exception to the hearsay rule.
Question 2: Here is the same argument with an explanation of the rule. This argument is better, but still incomplete because… (choose from the options that follow).
Conclusion – Joe exclaimed that “the light was red” immediately after the motor vehicle accident. His statement should be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Rule – A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused, is an excited utterance, which is not excluded as hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 803(2).
Rule explained through “key terms” (in bold) – Hearsay evidence is generally excluded. Fed. R. Evid. 802. In contrast, an excited utterance is not excluded by the rule against hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 803(2). The basis for this hearsay exception is the belief that a statement made under stress is likely to be trustworthy and unlikely to be premeditated falsehoods. Thus, to qualify, the statement must be spontaneously made by the person while still under the stress of excitement from the event or condition. CITE. The subject matter and content of the statement must “relate to” the event or condition. CITE. The statement could be a description or explanation or an opinion or inference. CITE.
Application – Joe’s statement that “the light was red” is an excited utterance.
Conclusion – Since Joe’s statement that “the light was red” is an excited utterance, it should be admitted into evidence.
Putting it all together: Here is the same argument with application of its key terms, which is a complete legal argument.
Note that the writer applies the key terms in the same order as they appear in the rule explanation. This general writing concept is called “parallel structure” and helps the reader follow your argument.
Exercise 1-2
Question 1: What’s wrong with the rule in this argument?
Conclusion – Immediately after the assault, the plaintiff prisoner shouted that “[Defendant] C.O. Smith had it out for me for years.” His statement should be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Rule – A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused, is not excluded as hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 803(2).
Application – The prisoner’s statement that “[Defendant] C.O. Smith had it out for me for years” is an excited utterance.
Conclusion – Therefore, the prisoner’s statement is an exception to the hearsay rule.
Question 2: Here is the same argument with the rule explained. This argument is better, but still incomplete because the writer does not apply the rule to the facts using the rule’s key terms. In the box provided below, rewrite the application applying the rule’s key terms.
Conclusion – Immediately after the assault that resulted in the plaintiff prisoner’s broken nose, the prisoner shouted that “[Defendant] C.O. Smith had it out for me for years.” His statement should be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Rule – A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused, is an excited utterance, which is not excluded as hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 803(2).
Rule explained through “key terms” (in bold) – Hearsay evidence is generally excluded. Fed. R. Evid. 802. In contrast, an excited utterance is not excluded by the rule against hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 803(2). The basis for this hearsay exception is the belief that a statement made under stress is likely to be trustworthy and unlikely to be premeditated falsehoods. Thus, to qualify the statement must be spontaneously made by the person while still under the stress of excitement from the event or condition. CITE. The subject matter and content of the statement must “relate to” the event or condition. CITE. The statement could be a description or explanation or an opinion or inference. CITE.
Application – The prisoner’s statement that “[Defendant] C.O. Smith had it out for me for years” is an excited utterance.
Conclusion – Since the prisoner’s statement that “[Defendant] C.O. Smith had it out for me for years” is an excited utterance, it should be admitted into evidence.
How to Explain a Rule
A rule explanation should consist of the rule’s “key terms,” Fn» which are the words or phrases at the heart of the controversy regarding how the rule applies. You will find the key terms in case law, where courts explain rules.
The facts of your case determine the key terms of your rule explanation. Use your explanation to identify the key terms a court would likely consider when analyzing the particular issue you write about. Keep your rule explanation as brief as possible, including further discussion of key terms only to the extent it is necessary for the reader to understand the nature of the law as it relates to the facts of your case. Judges are busy and want to know about the law only to the extent they need to determine the outcome of your case.
Exercise 1-3
Question: Assume your client Chaplin was injured when his vehicle was struck by a vehicle that had suddenly crossed over into his lane of traffic, and the police accident report concludes the cross-over was the sole cause of the collision. You determined the controlling case law is Caristo v. Sanzone, 96 N.Y.2d 172, 174 (2001), and Gouchie v. Gill, 198 A.D.2d 862, 862 (4th Dept. 1993), which follow. Find the key terms from the case law and write a rule explanation in the space provided that follows.
Antoinette Caristo et al., Appellants
v.
Augustine Sanzone et al., Respondents
96 N.Y.2d 172, 750 N.E.2d 36, 726 N.Y.S.2d 334, 2001 N.Y. Slip Op. 02891
Court of Appeals of New York
22
Argued February 6, 2001
Decided April 3, 2001
OPINION OF THE COURT
Graffeo, J.
The issue in this motor vehicle accident negligence case is whether the trial court erred in charging the jury on the emergency doctrine. Under the facts presented, we conclude that defendants were not entitled to this instruction.
At approximately 9:00 A.M. on the morning of the accident, defendant Augustine Sanzone was driving a vehicle owned by his wife, defendant Patricia Cinquemani, on Foster Road in Staten Island. At the same time, plaintiff Antoinette Caristo was operating her automobile on Woodrow Road. Foster Road terminated at a “T” intersection with Woodrow Road, and a stop sign controlled the flow of traffic from Foster Road onto Woodrow Road.
At trial, Sanzone testified that the weather conditions at 7:00 A.M. that day consisted of snow, rain and freezing rain. This mixed precipitation was unchanged when he and his family left their home at approximately 8:30 A.M. By the time he drove to Foster Road, the weather had worsened. He described the conditions as “more like frozen rain and hail at the time.” The temperature that morning was established, by stipulation of the parties, at 22 degrees Fahrenheit.
After cresting an incline on Foster Road, Sanzone proceeded downhill toward the Woodrow Road intersection, traveling at 20 to 25 miles per hour. At this juncture, his vehicle began to *174 slide and he noticed there was “a sheet of ice” on the hill. Despite Sanzone’s effort to pump the brakes, the vehicle slid 175 to 200 feet, past the stop sign and into Woodrow Road. As plaintiff approached the intersection at 15 to 20 miles per hour and saw defendants’ vehicle, she attempted to swerve to avoid a collision, but was unsuccessful. Both Cinquemani and the police officer who responded to the scene of the accident confirmed the icy conditions on Foster Road. Neither plaintiff nor Sanzone experienced difficulty controlling their vehicles prior to this incident.
Over plaintiff’s objection, the trial court charged the jury on the emergency doctrine. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants and the trial court entered a judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, with two Justices dissenting (274 AD2d 406). Plaintiff now appeals as a matter of right.
More than a century ago, this Court first considered the reasonableness of an actor’s conduct when confronted with a sudden emergency situation (see, Wynn v Central Park, N. & E. Riv. R. R. Co., 133 NY 575). Since then, we have articulated and applied the common-law emergency doctrine which “recognizes that when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327), provided the actor has not created the emergency.
The rationale for this doctrine–the need to instruct a jury that it may consider the reasonableness of a party’s conduct in light of the unexpected emergency confronting that person–has been somewhat eroded by the evolution from contributory negligence to comparative negligence. With the advent of the ability of juries to allocate fault and apportion damages, the viability of the doctrine has been questioned by some jurisdictions, with a few states going so far as to abolish it (see generally, Annotation, Modern Status Of Sudden Emergency Doctrine, 10 ALR5th 680).
In New York, in addition to the elements of the charge, we have defined the role of the Trial Judge in assessing the propriety of an emergency charge request. We require the *175 Judge to make the threshold determination that there is some reasonable view of the evidence supporting the occurrence of a “qualifying emergency” (Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., supra, 77 NY2d, at 327). Only then is a jury instructed to consider whether a defendant was faced with a sudden and unforeseen emergency not of the actor’s own making and, if so, whether defendant’s response to the situation was that of a reasonably prudent person (see, PJI 2:14 [3d ed]). The emergency instruction is, therefore, properly charged where the evidence supports a finding that the party requesting the charge was confronted by “a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration” (Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., supra, 77 NY2d, at 327; Kuci v Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth., 88 NY2d 923, 924; see also, Restatement [Second] of Torts § 296).
Here, even considering the evidence in a light most favorable to defendant (see, Kuci v Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth., supra, 88 NY2d, at 924), we hold as a matter of law that there was no qualifying event which justified issuance of the emergency instruction. Given Sanzone’s admitted knowledge of the worsening weather conditions, the presence of ice on the hill cannot be deemed a sudden and unexpected emergency. Although Sanzone did not encounter patches of ice on the roadways before losing control of his vehicle, at the time of the accident the temperature was well below freezing and it had been snowing, raining and hailing for at least two hours. As such, there was no reasonable view of the evidence that would lead to the conclusion that the ice and slippery road conditions on the Foster Road slope were sudden and unforeseen. Defendants were not, therefore, entitled to an emergency instruction and the charge to the jury constituted reversible error under these circumstances.
The dissent contrasts our holding here with Ferrer v. Harris (55 NY2d 285), where we concluded defendant was entitled to an emergency doctrine charge. Ferrer is clearly distinguishable in that defendant was confronted by an unanticipated event when a four-year old child ran in front of his vehicle from between two parked cars. The qualifying emergency–a child darting from a sidewalk into street traffic–is simply not analogous to the presence of ice and slippery conditions following at least two hours of inclement weather with temperatures well below freezing. *176
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and a new trial ordered.
David A. Gouchie, Respondent
v.
Robert Gill et al., Respondents, and Robert F. Cook, Appellant
198 A.D.2d 862, 605 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1993)
Opinion:
Order unanimously reversed on the law with costs, motion granted and complaint dismissed.
Memorandum:
Supreme Court erred in denying defendant Robert F. Cook’s (defendant) motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ complaints. A driver in his proper lane of travel is not required to anticipate that a car going in the opposite direction will cross over into that lane (see, Palmer v Palmer, 31 AD2d 876, 877, affd 27 NY2d 945; Gooch v Shapiro, 7 AD2d 307, affd 8 NY2d 1088). The failure of a driver, not otherwise negligent, who encounters such a car, “to avert the consequence[s] of such an emergency can seldom be considered negligent” (Breckir v Lewis, 21 AD2d 546, 549, affd sub nom. Breckir v Pleibel, 15 NY2d 1027, citing Meyer v Whisnant, 307 NY 369). A driver faced with a vehicle careening across the highway directly into his path “is not liable for [his] failure to exercise the best judgment or for any error[s] of judgment on [his] part” (Wolfson v Darnell, 15 AD2d 516, 517, affd in part and dismissed in part 12 NY2d 819). Once a defendant establishes that a head-on collision was caused by plaintiff’s crossing over into defendant’s lane of travel, defendant has established “a complete defense to plaintiff’s action” (Eisenbach v Rogers, 158 AD2d 792, 793, lv denied 79 NY2d 752; see also, Morowitz v Naughton, 150 AD2d 536, 537). It then becomes “incumbent upon plaintiff to submit evidence in admissible form to create an *863 issue of fact as to [defendant’s] negligence contributing to the happening of the accident” (Eisenbach v Rogers, supra, at 793).
Defendant’s proof concerning the manner in which the accident occurred was sufficient to establish a complete defense to plaintiffs’ actions. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, failed to raise a triable issue of fact concerning possible negligence of the defendant that might have contributed to the accident. Even considering two statements of defendant, which were not in admissible form (see, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 563), we conclude that plaintiffs offered no evidence to suggest that defendant could have done something to avoid the collision (see, Eisenbach v Rogers, supra, at 793; Morowitz v Naughton, supra, at 537; see also, Viegas v Esposito, 135 AD2d 708, 709, lv denied 72 NY2d 801). (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Erie County, Wolfgang, J. — Summary Judgment.) Present — Callahan, J. P., Pine, Balio, Doerr and Boomer, JJ.
Except for the key terms, avoid over reliance on the court’s actual language, which can result in an awkward series of quotes. For concise rule explanations, use ellipses (Bluebook R. 5.3), and minimize the use of block quotations.
Ground your Rule Explanation in Binding Authority
You should base any argument on binding authority. So when a key term is based on persuasive authority only, you should ground it by linking the term to binding authority. In the hierarchy of authority statutory text from the jurisdiction you write to is always binding. So, the first “key term” or proposition that explains the rule may come from statutory text, while those that follow may provide interpretations of this text offered by persuasive courts that have been called on to apply the statutory text.
In the following example, the writer wants to show that the moving party has the burden to show good cause for the issuance of a protective order. But the writer’s authority, In re Terrorists Attacks on September 11, 2001, 454 F. Supp. 2d 220, 221-22 (S.D.N.Y.) is persuasive only because it is a trial level court. Thus, the writer grounds the rule in binding authority (Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)), and links that authority to the rule the writer applies.
A court may, only for good cause shown, grant a protective order “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). But it is the burden of the party seeking a protective order to “show that good cause exists of the issuance of that order.” In re Terrorists Attacks on September 11, 2001, 454 F. Supp. 2d 220, 221-22 (S.D.N.Y.).
You may also ground a rule with a citation to a higher court in your jurisdiction. Thus, when writing to a federal trial level court, you can ground your rule in an opinion from the court of appeals that governs the trial court. In the following example, the writer wants to show that allegations of a painful foot do not meet the standard for a prisoner’s claim of failure to provide medical care. But the writer’s authority, Chatin v. Artuz, is persuasive only because it is a trial level court. Thus, the writer grounds it with a cite to the court of appeals that governs the trial court and links that authority to the rule the writer applies.
Exercise 1-4
Question 1: Assume you are writing to a district court in the Third Circuit. Which of these rules is grounded? (Choose all that apply.)
Question 2: Assume you are writing to a district court in the Third Circuit, and want to ground this rule: “Ordinarily, good cause exists ‘when a party shows that disclosure will result in a clearly defined, specific and serious injury.’” In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 454 F. Supp. 2d 220, 221-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Read the excerpt from the Terrorist Attacks opinion in the box below and find binding authority to ground the rule. Then, in the space provided, enter the binding authority to ground the rule.
You can ground a rule when you don’t have something directly on point through inductive reasoning, which is a method of drawing conclusions by going from the specific to the general. For example, assume you respond to a motion to dismiss a civil rights claim against a local police department based on the defendant’s argument that your failure to name the individual officer involved is fatal to the federal civil rights claim. You want to explain that to prevail a plaintiff need not sue the individual government employee. You find authority that is directly on point, but you are writing to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and your only authority is from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
Through your research on the issue you find that the United States Supreme Court held that local governments can be liable only for constitutional harms that are directly attributable to the local entity itself, which includes liability when municipal organization’s failure to train, or the policies or customs that it has sanctioned, led to an independent constitutional violation. Thus, local governments are not liable under a theory of respondeat superior for the unconstitutional acts of its employees. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). To ground your key term, you begin with Monell, and then cite to the Second Circuit opinion. Your rule explanation would then be:
Local governments can be liable only for constitutional harms that are directly attributable to the local entity itself, which includes liability when municipal organization’s failure to train, or the policies or customs that it has sanctioned, led to an independent constitutional violation. Thus, local governments are not liable under a theory of respondeat superior for the unconstitutional acts of its employees. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). However, to prevail a plaintiff need not sue the individual government employees, but may proceed solely against the municipality. Askins v. Doe No. 1, 727 F.3d 248 (2d Cir. 2013).
Applying the Rule
Legal writers apply the rule to the facts of their case after they have explained a rule through key terms. They do this by applying the key terms that explain the rule to the facts of the case. To help your reader follow the argument, apply the key terms in the same order they are introduced in the rule explanation.
Exercise 1-5
Question: In the text below, first find the key terms in the rule explanation, then find where they are applied. In the space that follows, enter the key terms you found.
A property owner has a common-law duty to inspect, repair and maintain exterior and common areas of his leased space. Wynn v. T.R.I.P. Redevelopment Associates, 296 A.D.2d 1767 (3d Dept. 2002). So, questions regarding a defendant’s knowledge of the presence of chipping and peeling paint on the exterior of a leased space may not be resolved on summary judgment. Id. (noting that “[b]ecause defendants had a common-law obligation to inspect and maintain the non-leased portions of the building, a jury may find that they were aware or should have been aware of the … paint condition in the common areas as described by plaintiff’s testimony – credited by Court for purposes of defendants’ summary judgment motion”). Therefore, when attempting to defeat a notice-based summary judgment motion, a plaintiff can satisfy the third Chapman factor by producing evidence that demonstrates the presence of chipping or peeling paint on the exterior or common areas of his leased space. Id.
The evidence before this Court raises a question of fact about whether the property owner was aware or should have been aware of presence of chipping paint on the exterior of 60 New Amsterdam. During her deposition, plaintiff’s mother testified that paint chips were present “everywhere” on the exterior first floor front porch. See, Joy Affidavit at Exhibit D, pp. 85. Plaintiff’s mother linked the paint chips’ origin to the exterior poles and columns. See id. at 86. Additionally, during his own deposition, Defendant explained that he “could not remember” whether peeling or chipping paint was present on the exterior but did admit to visiting the common areas at least twice per month during the course of plaintiff’s tenancy. See, Joy Affidavit at Exhibit C, pp. 30
Exercise 1-6
Question: What is wrong with this rule application?
The principle that a citizen may bring an Article 78 proceeding to enforce a public interest has been a fundamental tenet of New York common law since at least the middle of the nineteenth century. The New York Court of Appeals found that when a county treasurer refused to issue a warrant for tax collection, “a proceeding by mandamus is the proper remedy, and may be instituted by any citizen having a common interest in the collection of the tax.” People v. Halsey, 37 N.Y. 344 (1867).
The Court of Appeals reaffirmed the principle in the middle of the twentieth century, stating “the erroneous appointments ought to be open to attack by the petitioners, because as citizens and taxpayers they are entitled to an opportunity to insist upon the construction which this court placed upon the civil service article of the State Constitution.” Cash v. Bates, 301 N.Y. 258, 261 (1950). This Department has cited Cash for the proposition that, “Any citizen may maintain a mandamus proceeding to compel a public officer to do his duty.” Albert Elia Bldg. Co. v. N.Y.S. Urban Dev. Corp., 54 A.D.2d 337, 341 (4th Dept. 1976).
The Petitioners in the instant action are Erie County citizens, residents, and taxpayers. While not required to establish standing, as members of the now-disbanded Erie County Community Corrections Advisory Board, they have both a public interest and a particular interest in maintaining standards at the county jails. In that regard, they are like every person in Erie County; as Petitioners’ counsel stated in oral argument before the lower court, there is a public interest to ensure that the Sheriff perform his duty to report:
Every single one of us…at some point has a risk of some family member or possibly our self or someone else we care about ending up in [the Holding Center]. Every single one of us had an interest in that facility being run and organized in a way that provides everyone who’s in it with due process, with the protections that they are entitled to under the New York and Federal Constitution with a safe and secure place, including the people who work there. And part of the procedure that the State of New York had determined need to be in place to ensure that we all have a safe jail are the procedures that require reporting of incidents.
(R. 17-18).
In the next chapter, you will read about why and how you might add reasoning by analogy to your analysis or argument.
